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   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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                        UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                   FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
11
                              EASTERN DIVISION
12
                                      No. ED CR 13-116-VAP
   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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                  Plaintiff,
                                      GOVERNMENT'S MOTION IN LIMINE
14
                                      NO. 3: TO PRECLUDE INTRODUCTION
                                      OF DEFENDANTS' HEARSAY BY
                  v.
15
                                      DEFENDANTS
   KAWAUM MARQUEZ SCOTT,
                                                     April 29, 2014
16
   NEKEYIA NECOLE WEATHERSPOON,
                                      Trial Date:
        aka "Keey Bee,"
                                      Pretrial
17
                                      Conference:
                                                     April 21, 2014
                  Defendants.
                                                     9:00 a.m.
18
                                      Location:
                                                     Courtroom 2
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        Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel
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   of record, the United States Attorney for the Central District of
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   California and Assistant United States Attorney Thomas D. Stout,
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   hereby moves in limine to preclude defendants Kawaum Marquez Scott
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   ("defendant Scott") and Nekeyia Necole Weatherspoon ("defendant
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   Weatherspoon") from offering evidence, argument, or cross-
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   examination regarding any hearsay statements made by defendants.
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This motion is based on the attached memorandum of points and authorities, all the files and records of this case, and such other oral and written argument that is permitted by the Court. Dated: March 31, 2014 Respectfully submitted, ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR. United States Attorney JOSEPH B. WIDMAN Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Riverside Branch Office /s/ THOMAS D. STOUT Assistant United States Attorney Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Between October 2012, and December 2012, defendants Kawaum Marquez Scott ("defendant Scott") and Nekeyia Necole Weatherspoon ("defendant Weatherspoon") recruited the then-14-year-old child victim in this case to work for them as a prostitute. They advertised her services through the internet, instructed her to perform numerous sexual acts with customers, and collected from the money customers paid her.

At trial, the government intends to introduce inculpatory statements made by defendants during video-recorded interviews with investigating agents. In addition to the inculpatory statements the government intends to introduce, defendants made various exculpatory statements during the interview that the government does not intend to introduce at trial. As set forth below, such exculpatory statements are inadmissible hearsay which the Court should exclude if defendants seek to introduce them.

II. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS

A summary of defendants' alleged conduct is set forth in the government's motion in limine No. 1, and is hereby incorporated by reference. The government will only discuss additional facts specifically pertaining to this motion.

After their arrest on November 14, 2013, defendants both consented to be interviewed by investigating agents. Both made a variety of inculpatory admissions and exculpatory claims during those interviews.

The child victim turned fifteen during the course of defendants' conduct.

On March 30, 2014, the government disclosed to defense counsel the portions of those interviews it currently intends to introduce at ${\rm trial.}^2$

III. ARGUMENT

As the government only seeks to introduce portions of the video recorded interviews, defendants may seek to introduce their own exculpatory claims made during those interviews in lieu of testifying at trial. Because such evidence is hearsay when offered by the party making the statements, the Court should exclude such evidence and order defendants to refrain from referring to such evidence either in cross-examination or argument.

A. DEFENDANTS MAY NOT AVOID TESTIFYING BY RELYING ON THEIR OWN SELF-SERVING HEARSAY STATEMENTS ELICITED FROM OTHER WITNESSES.

A defendant's prior, out-of-court statements are admissible only if offered against him or her. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). If elicited by the defendant, such statements are inadmissible hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c); <u>United States v. Fernandez</u>, 839 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (district court properly sustained government's hearsay objection to defendant's attempt to solicit defendant's post-arrest statement during cross-examination of government witness).

A defendant does not have the right to present self-serving hearsay statements. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1); see also United States v. Orteaga, 203 F.3d 675, 682 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming order limiting defendant's ability to elicit his exculpatory hearsay

The government reserves the right to amend its intended exhibit list, including the excerpts of these videos it intends to introduce, prior to trial.

States v. Willis, 759 F.2d 1486, 1501 (11th Cir. 1985) (defendant's attempt to elicit exculpatory statements made at the time of arrest to prove he lacked requisite knowledge was inadmissible hearsay).

To permit a defendant to place his statements before the jury without subjecting him to cross-examination would be to allow "precisely what the hearsay rule forbids." Fernandez, 839 F.2d at 640.

B. THE RULE OF COMPLETENESS DOES NOT TRUMP THE RULE AGAINST HEARSAY.

A defendant may not invoke Federal Rule of Evidence 106, also known as the "rule of completeness," to circumvent the rules barring hearsay evidence. "[R]ule 106 does not compel admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence." <u>United States v. Collicott</u>, 92 F.3d 973, 983 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, the rule of completeness does not require the government to enter all of defendants' statements made during an interview or permit the defendants to circumvent the rules against hearsay by seeking to elicit other, non-incriminating statements from government witnesses, or defense witnesses other than defendant. <u>See, e.g.</u>, <u>Orteaga</u>, 203 F.3d at 682; <u>Collicott</u>, 92 F.3d at 983.

IV. CONCLUSION

Defendants may not place their own hearsay statements into evidence. This includes eliciting their own statements through defense witnesses or through government witnesses on cross-examination. Accordingly, the government respectfully requests that the Court issue an order precluding defendants from eliciting their own self-serving out of court statements from witnesses at trial and

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